Online Payments: Attack and Defense

Or, how to not get pwned while processing card-not-present transactions


Overview

- Credit Card Anatomy
- What's a Card-Not-Present transaction?
- Merchant and Issuer roles
- Threats / Attacks
- Balancing Risk

Not pictured: EMV chip


BANK CO		
4282 0811 0593 3452		
VALID THRU	CARDHOLDER NAME	
12/23	NAMEY DOE	
		1

Primary Account Number (PAN)



Primary Account Number
(PAN):

• Bank ID Number (BIN)




17360"

Primary Account Number (PAN):

• Bank ID Number (BIN)

curl -H "Accept-Version: 3	" "https://lookup.binlist.net/457
{	
"number": { "length": 16,	
"luhn": true	
},	
"scheme": "visa", "type": "debit",	
"brand": "Visa/Dankort",	
"prepaid": false,	
"country": {	
"numeric": "208",	
"alpha2": "DK",	
"name": "Denmark",	
"emoji": "≓",	
"currency": "DKK",	
"latitude": 56,	
"longitude": 10	
},	
"bank": {	
"name": "Jyske Bank",	
"url": "www.jyskebank.dk",	
"phone": "+4589893300",	
"city": "Hjørring"	
}	
}	




Primary Account Number
(PAN):

- Bank ID Number (BIN)
- Account Identifier



Primary Account Number
(PAN):

- Bank ID Number (BIN)
- Account Identifier
- Check Digit





Back of Card

Signature: Namey Doe

CVV: 737

Cardholder not physically present at the time of transaction.

- Mail order
- Telephone
- Fax

Cardholder not physically present at the time of transaction.

- Mail order
- Telephone
- Fax
- The internet

- No EMV, no magstripe
- What's required?

• Card number (PAN) + expiration date

The rest is (usually) optional -

Validation available from the issuer

- CVV2 / CVS
- Address (full or partial) / AVS
- Cardholder Name / ANI
- 3-D Secure (surprise sometimes required)

We'll come back to these in detail.


What's a Merchant

"... any *entity* that accepts payment cards bearing the logos of any PCI SSC Participating Payment Brand as payment for goods and/or services." (PCI-DSS)

or...

You have customers that are paying you for goods or services (with credit cards).

Merchant and Issuer



Threats

Threats

- 1. Data Thieves
 - a. Compromise your system to steal card details
- 2. Card Testers
 - a. Use your system to verify/attest card details
- 3. Fraudsters
 - a. Use your system to extract value through goods, services or monetary value with stolen card details.

Not covered: ATO, friendly fraud, phishing

Threat #1: Data Thieves

- Skimming will try to intercept card details sent transiently, without being noticed.
- Looking for card data at rest (if lucky!)
 - Logs, database
 - Plaintext, encrypted, hashed
- PCI-DSS

Value

- Sell the card data
- Or, use the card data for fraud

2018 British Airways hack

 380,000 cardholder details compromised including address and CVV^[1]



[1] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iag-cybercrime-british-airways/ba-apologizes-after-380000-customers-hit-in-cyber-attack-idUSKCN1LM2P6


2018 British Airways hack

- Skimming intercepted card details on the front-end with malicious javascript^[1]
- Data at rest found 95 days worth of card details in unencrypted logs^[1]

[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20240206185013/https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/mpns/2618421/ba-penalty-20201016.pdf

Detection and Mitigation

 Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS)



PCI-DSS

- Protect Cardholder Data at rest and in transit
- Maintain a Secure Network
- Implement Strong Access Controls and Monitoring
- Also fines

Storing and Transmitting Card Data

• Simply Do Not

Mind the front-end

- Keeping data away from the backend isn't enough
- PCI DSS v4.0 has lots of guidance on front-end



Threat #2: Card Testers

- Use you as a way to test out unattested card data
 Either purchased cheaply or taken from freely available sources
- Use you to guess card numbers from partial data
 - \circ Partial data from other breaches, or BIN stuffing

Value

- Sell the now cleaned, attested card data
- Or, use the card data for fraud

- Stolen card details are bought and sold regularly at online marketplaces.
- Data quality is major factor in price.

Brian's Club														
	Bin 🗘	Туре	Debit/Credit	Subtype	Exp Date	Track1	Billing zip	Code	Country	Address	Bank	Base	Price	Cart
	493404	THE	CREDIT	N/A	XX/23	*	-	201	•	N/A	EUFISERV (Paramount	40.95 \$	7
	492184	NIM	CREDIT	N/A	XX/23	-	•	201		N/A	KRUNG THAI BANK PUBLIC CO., LTD. (Paramount	40.95 \$	
	440066	THE	CREDIT	SIGNATURE	XX/23	-		201		N/A	NA (Paramount	25.20 \$	
	440066	NIA	CREDIT	SIGNATURE	XX/23	-	4	201		NA	NA (Paramount	25.20 \$	
	517604		CREDIT	N/A	XX/24	-	-	201		NY	CHINA MINSHENG BANKING CORP., LTD. (BMW	49.14 \$	7
	490624	THE	CREDIT	N/A	XX/23	-	•	201	(NA	BC CARD CO., LTD. ((C))	Paramount	32.76 \$	7
	557729		CREDIT	ELECTRONIC	XX/23	-	-	201		NA	UNICREDIT BANK HUNGARY ZRT.	Paramount	40.95 \$	
	490765	THE	CREDIT	CLASSIC	XX/23	1		201		N/A	TOPCARD SERVICE, S.A. (Paramount	40.95 \$	7
	522094		DEBIT	PREPAID	XX/27	-	-	201			BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA PUERTO RICO (Lotta	26.52 \$	7
	529580		DEBIT	PREPAID	XX/26			201		FL	VINCENTO PAYMENT SOLUTIONS, LTD.	Album	26.52 \$	

https://webz.io/dwp/the-top-5-deep-and-dark-web-credit-card-sites/

Detection

- Auth rates / conversion
- Anomalous traffic sources and patterns
- Low value transactions
- Chargebacks (late and expensive)

Mitigation

- Low-hanging fruit: bot protection
- Reduce volume by driving up cost for attackers



Mitigation

- CVV, AVS and 3DS
- All signal provided by issuer

Mitigation cont'd

- CVV
 - \circ $\,$ Don't ever store this $\,$

Code	Description
М	Match
Ν	No Match
Р	Not Processed
S	Merchant has indicated that CVV2 is not present on card
U	Issuer is not certified and/or has not provided encryption key
I	Invalid or no response

Card Testers

Mitigation

• AVS (address)

Code	Description
Υ	Full Match
А	Partial Match (street address only)
Z	Partial Match (postal/zip only)
Ν	Non-Match
U	Unable to Verify
R	Indeterminate Outcome (Retry)

Card Testers

Mitigation cont'd

- 3DS (3D Secure)
- Not entirely up to merchant
- Used much more widely outside of the US

++ [Bank Logo]
3D Secure Verification
Enter the OTP sent to your mobile: ++
 [Submit]

Card Testers

Mitigation cont'd

- Don't be a cheap oracle!
- Other step-ups, trade-offs

Threat #3: Fraudsters


- Use stolen card details to purchase goods or services.
- Or, more directly extract money through self-payment.



 Billions of dollars lost annually to Card-Not-Present fraud in the US alone

US Total Card-Not-Present (CNP) Fraud Loss, 2019-2024

billions, % change, and % of total card payment fraud loss



Note: includes losses incurred by the merchant, consumer, and issuer for fraudulent remote payment transactions occurring via credit, debit, and prepaid cards; CNP transactions include internet, telephone, and mail-order transactions Source: Insider Intelligence, Sep 2022

Detection

- Anomalous patterns, maybe
- Auth rates and conversion hits, maybe
- Chargebacks :'(
- You need a risk engine

Mitigation

- CVV, AVS, 3DS
- Address matching
- KYC, SCA
- Risk Engine



Balancing Risk

The merchant has to balance deterring bad actors, with the risk of turning away good customers.

The ideal system would block 100% of bad traffic and convert 100% of good customers. This does not exist.



Balancing Risk

- No silver bullets
- Pull in different signals
- Make good decisions



The End

- Be smart about protecting cardholder data, and avoid storing it whenever possible. Understand PCI beyond the checkboxes.
- Understand the value you provide attackers.
- Don't be an easy or cheap target.
- Balancing risk is multi-faceted.

